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Available online 11 September 2017TheUK change of government in 2010provoked a large structural change in the English education landscape. Un-
expectedly, the new government offered primary schools the chance to have ‘the freedom and the power to take
control of their own destiny’, with better performing schools given a green light to fast track convert to become
an academy school. In England, schools that become academies have more freedom over many ways in which
they operate, including curriculum design, budgets, stafﬁng issues and the shape of the academic year. However,
the change to allow primary school academisation has been controversial. This paper reports estimates of the
causal effect of academyenrolment onprimary school pupils.While the international literature provides growing
evidence on the effect of school autonomy in a variety of contexts, little is known about the effect of autonomyon
primary schools (which are typicallymuch smaller than secondary schools) and in contextswhere the converting
school is not deemed to be failing or disadvantaged. The key ﬁndings are that English primary schools did change
their mode of operation after the exogenous policy change, utilising more autonomy and changing spending be-
haviour, but this did not lead to improved pupil performance.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).2 Most new academies since 2010 are ‘converters’. However, some academies are spon-1. Introduction
Since 2010, the educational landscape in England has radically al-
tered. By 2017, nearly two-thirds of secondary schools and over a ﬁfth
of primary schools are academies. Academy schools are granted consid-
erable operational autonomy by government and have a battery of free-
doms they can use that standard state schools cannot. As Michael Gove,
the Minister then responsible for education, put it by enabling
academisation these schools have been ‘given the freedom and the
power to take control of their own destiny’.1
Although academies were present before then – principally as a
school improvement policy for underperforming secondary schools
since 2002 – the programme was radically altered and signiﬁcantly ex-
panded following the election of the new UK government in May 2010.
It became a school structure to which all schools were invited to aspireRockoff, two referees and the
nces: Gabriel Heller-Sahlgren,
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nd Social Research Council.
l Gove MP.
. This is an open access article underas enabling legislation – the Academies Act of 2010 –was rapidly put in
place two months after the election of the new government.2 For the
ﬁrst time, and through this completely unexpected policy change,3 pri-
mary schools were invited to become academies, with better
performing schools being given priority to convert. The ﬁrst batch of
such schools converted in the school year beginning in September
2010. This paper reports estimates of the impact of primary school con-
version to academy status on their operation and on the performance of
enrolled pupils.
This introduction of primary academies took place in an internation-
al context where publicly-funded autonomous schools have become a
familiar form of school improvement policy, most notably throughsored (i.e. managed by a private team of independent co-sponsors) and these are schools
that have been underperforming. The effect of academisation on these schools (which are
closer to the original NewLabour academies, studied by Eyles andMachin, 2015, and com-
prise about 30% of primary academies) is not considered in this paper, becausewewant to
explore the unexpected dimension of academisation that applied to converters, and espe-
cially those rated outstanding prior to the 2010 change in policy.
3 The introduction of ‘Free schools’ and education reformwere issues raised in theman-
ifesto of the new government prior to their election; however, there was no mention of
large-scale expansion of the academies programme. Free schools are completely new
schools that can be set up by interested parties (e.g. parents, or community members).
By 2016/17, there were 139 free primary schools open or approved.
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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former tends to ﬁnd achievement gains associated with charter status
and with the ‘injection’ of charter school features to public schools, par-
ticularly in urban settings where the schools typically enrol disadvan-
taged students.4 In the Swedish context, there is some evidence of
positive short and long term effects of the free school program, but
these are found to work primarily through competition (see Bolhmark
and Lindahl, 2015).
The policy studied here differs from most others in the literature in
three important respects. Firstly, it involves conversion of existing
schools rather than the creation of new schools.5 Secondly, it is about
the voluntary conversion of better performing schools and not the
forced conversion of failing schools. These better performing schools
very clearly have a lower proportion of children from disadvantaged
backgrounds. Thirdly, the focus is on young children (aged 7–11) who
attend primary schools, which are much smaller than secondary
schools.6 Although there have been studies of elementary schools in
the charter school context, these are less prevalent than studies of mid-
dle and high schools. Similarly, studies of autonomy in the context of the
English education system have focused on particular subsets of second-
ary schools; speciﬁcally, advantaged secondary schools voluntarily
gaining greater autonomy (Clark, 2009), disadvantaged secondary
schools (Eyles and Machin, 2015), and secondary schools in relatively
disadvantaged local authorities (e.g. Birmingham in the case of Bertoni
et al., 2017).
Upon conversion, academy schools gain autonomy over many pro-
cess and personnel decisions. This greater freedom may have positive
effects on student outcomes because of superior information held by
local decision makers (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011). Indeed, the
ﬁrst secondary schools in England to become academies (in the early
2000s) did seem to deliver positive effects on student outcomes (Eyles
andMachin, 2015; and Eyles et al., 2016a, 2016b). However, the context
was one in which a couple of hundred (previously signiﬁcantly
underperforming) secondary schools became academies. It is not neces-
sarily the case that these positive effects carry through to better
performing schools and/or to (much smaller) primary schools.
If the autonomy offered within the academies model was unambig-
uously advantageous for schools, one would imagine that all schools
would want to become academies. However, recently the UK govern-
ment has had to back out of a policy to force all schools in England to be-
come academies by the end of 2022 because of ﬁerce hostility to this by
the educational establishment (although the current government vision
is still to encourage all schools to become academies).
Whether such radical upheaval is in the interests of students is an
empirical question. Most schools yet to convert are primary schools,4 Epple, Romano and Zimmer (2016) provide an overview of the literature. While
something of a consensus has emerged, there is also some controversy within the charter
school research. Recent experimental studies of charters in or near particular US cities
(Boston and New York) ﬁnd positive impacts on educational achievement (see
Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2011; Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2016; Angrist et al., 2010, 2013; Dobbie
and Fryer, 2011, 2013; Hoxby and Murarka, 2009). Wider coverage evaluations have pro-
ducedmoremixed results (Betts et al., 2006; Center for Research on Education Outcomes,
2009, 2013; Gleason et al., 2010). Similarly, there is no consensus on the longer term ef-
fects of charters. Angrist et al. (2016) and Dobbie and Fryer (2014) ﬁne that charter atten-
dance improves longer run outcomes such as college attendance. In laterwork, Dobbie and
Fryer (2016) ﬁnd negative earnings returns for those attending charters that are ineffec-
tive at raising test scores and no returns for charters that are successful at raising test
scores.
5 While the majority of school autonomy studies focus on newly set up autonomous
schools (e.g. the majority of US charters are new schools), there are some examples of
studies where existing schools become more autonomous. Clark (2009) and Eyles and
Machin (2015) study English secondary schools gaining more autonomy, while
Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2016) study the conversion of traditional public schools in New
Orleans to (in-district) charters. Alongside these Steinberg (2014) studies the granting
of greater operational freedom to a subset of principals in already existing Chicago Public
Schools.
6 While the majority of charter papers focus on middle and high schools, some papers
do include results for elementary schools (Dobbie and Fryer, 2011, 2013; and Hoxby
et al., 2009).which represent the vast majority of schools in England. One might
hypothesise that schools which volunteered to convert to academy sta-
tus early-on are those that were most amenable to academy status, an-
ticipating positive beneﬁts. If effects are not found for such schools, one
might questionwhether it is such a good idea to extend it to schools that
are less enthusiastic.
An important feature of the policy being studied here is that it was in
noway anticipated by schools or parents. This gives leverage to identify
causal effects since the conversion was exogenous to pupils already en-
rolled in the school. Thus, the sample studied is restricted to these “leg-
acy enrolled” pupils who can be observed before and after
academisation takes place. The importance of estimating effects for pu-
pils who were already enrolled in the school prior to conversion
emerges because student mobility post-conversion is potentially en-
dogenous to the policy itself. For example, parents may be attracted
by the idea of academy status and bemore likely to enrol their children
to newly converted primary schools. Exit from the school post-
conversion might also be non-random (for example, if schools change
policies in a way that is less attractive to certain students or their par-
ents). However, in the empirical work discussed below, a very strong
ﬁrst stage estimate (of the effect of pre-conversion enrolment on the
probability of attending an academy) suggests that a causal effect of
academy attendance is identiﬁed for the majority of eligible pupils in
the school.
In practical terms, the empirical strategy adopted in this paper ﬁrst
involves selection of treatment and control groups of schools. The treat-
ment group consists of primary schools that converted to academy sta-
tus between 2010/11 and 2014/15. In each case, the control groups are
those that converted in later academic years, but before 2016/17. Under
certain conditions, these treatment and control schools are shown to
have similar pre-trends in outcome variables. Further, enrolment in
the primary school prior to conversion is used as an instrument for ac-
tual attendance in the academy in grade 6 when national tests in read-
ing and maths take place. The legacy enrolment strategy mirrors that
used in Eyles and Machin (2015) in their study of the ﬁrst
underperforming English secondary schools to become academies in
the early 2000s. It also draws on Fryer (2014) who looks at the effect
of injecting charter school practices into traditional public schools and
Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2016), who study school takeovers in New
Orleans, referring to pupils who stay in converting schools as ‘grand-fa-
thered’ pupils.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes pri-
mary education in England and offers a discussion of the institutional
features characterising the introduction of academy schools. Section 3
describes the data and research strategy. Section 4 reports results
from the ﬁrst part of the empirical analysis, looking at whether primary
schools that became academies did in fact change their modes of oper-
ation upon conversion. Section 5 reports the legacy enrolment results
looking at causal effects of academy conversion on pupil performance.
Conclusions are given in Section 6.2. Primary education in England and academy schools
2.1. Primary education
In England, children start school in the September after they reach
the age of 4. Most children attend a primary school up to age 11, after
which they go to secondary school.7 Schooling in England is organised
into Key Stages. At the end of Key Stage 1 (age 7), pupils are assessed
by their teachers in English and maths according to national guidelines.7 There is a small number of infant schools and middle schools in parts of the country.
They are not included in this analysis unless they are ‘linked’, meaning that students at
an infant school are prioritised for places at the junior school; in these cases, the propor-
tion of infant school attendees switching to the linked junior school is very high and the
two linked schools are treated as though they were one single school.
Fig. 1. Number of primary school academies in England Notes: The ﬁgure shows the
number of primary/middle deemed primary schools open in each school year as
academies, and/or free schools. Source data Edubase, available at http://www.education.
gov.uk/edubase/home.xhtml.
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glish and maths.8 These tests are used to construct Performance
Tables for primary schools, which are publicly available. There is next
to no grade repetition within the system.
Up until the introduction of academies in 2010, schooling had been
organised at the local level into Local Education Authorities (LEAs).
There are 152 LEAs in England and around 15,000 primary schools. The
LEA's main functions in relation to primary schools are in building and
maintaining schools, providing support services (e.g. for children with
special needs), and acting in an advisory role to the head teacher regard-
ing school performance and implementation of government initiatives.
LEAs also have an important role in the funding allocations of
schools. The bulk of schools funding comes from the dedicated schools
grant which is given to LEAs and then distributed according to the
LEA's own funding formula. The funding allocated to the LEA is based
on a historically determined formula which is mainly driven by the
numbers of pupils, ‘additional educational needs’ and local conditions.
These local conditions include population sparsity,measures of depriva-
tion, and wage costs in the area (Roberts and Bolton, 2017).
As well as allocating funding, the LEA also appoints one or two rep-
resentatives on to a school's governing body – a group of parents,
teachers and community representatives that provides governance to
the school. LEAs typically offer a number of administrative andmanage-
ment functions including training, personnel and ﬁnancial services. Up
until the 2010/11 school year, the majority of primary aged pupils
(67%) attended community schools in which LEAs are the statutory em-
ployer of school staff, owner of the buildings and the authority that
manages student admissions.9 Most other state primary schools are
faith schools (which have greater autonomy from the LEA). Although
parents can apply to send their child to any primary school (i.e. there
are no strict catchment areas), popular schools are often oversubscribed
and places are rationed according to a Schools Admissions Code.10
2.2. Academy schools
When a school becomes an academy, it is governed outside the LEA
and is overseen and fundeddirectly by central government. An academy
school is run inmanyways like a company, where governors are classed
as trustees or directors and the principal/head teacher is the chief exec-
utive. Strong ﬁnancial management and governance at the level of the
individual academy are very important (National Audit Ofﬁce, 2012),
especially given that oversight is no longer provided by the LEA. Unlike
Community Schools (i.e. most state primary schools), academies man-
age their own admissions.While they still have to adhere to the Schools
Admissions Code, theymay choose to run their admissions policy differ-
ently than in the past. Although academies are required to teach a broad
and balanced curriculum, including English, maths, science and reli-
gious education, they are not legally required to use the national curric-
ulum. They have the ability to set their own pay and conditions for staff
and more freedom in their hiring decisions (e.g. they may hire unqual-
iﬁed teachers).11 Although academies are supposed to be funded on an
equal basis with non-academies, they do get extra funds to cover the
services that the LEA provides freely to other state maintained
schools12; therefore, they have greater freedom on how to use the8 Prior to 2010, students were also assessed in science.
9 For more information about the operation of primary schools and local government
prior to 2010, see Gibbons et al. (2011).
10 The School Admissions code applies to all state-maintained schools and academies. In
practice, schools have very little scope to employ differing admission criteria (all schools
aside from community schools and a limited amount of religious schools, where the LEA
determines the criteria, set their own). All schools have to accept applications unless they
are oversubscribed. In the case of oversubscription the criteria that schools can use are lim-
ited (distance, presence of sibling at school) and the adopted criteria tends to vary little
across schools.
11 Those with qualiﬁed teacher status typically have an undergraduate degree and have
completed a one year postgraduate teacher training course.
12 Schools are given a £25,000 grant to support the conversion process.budget allocation. They also have the responsibility of organisingpayroll
functions, insurance and accountancy functions in-house or by
contracting this out. Academies also have the ability to change the
length of the school day and the shape of the academic year (through
term times).
In the interests of minimising risk following the Academies Act of
2010, the Department of Education adopted a phased approach to
the criteria for schools wishing to convert (National Audit Ofﬁce,
2012), prioritising and giving a green light in the conversion process
to better performing schools. A key component of this prioritising
decision featured the rating in the reports of the Schools Inspectorate
(Ofsted) that visits schools every 3–5 years and rates schools on a
four point scale ranging from ‘outstanding’ to ‘unsatisfactory’. At
the time, about 20% of schools were rated as ‘outstanding’ and 50%
as ‘good’.
The coalition government initially prioritised schools rated as out-
standing and fast-tracked their applications for conversion. The ﬁrst
such schools were converted to academy status in September 2010. In
November of the same year, this fast track route was extended to all
good schools with outstanding features. At the same time, recognising
the potential for economies of scale, academies were also encouraged
to convert in chains or undertake some post-conversion collaborative
arrangement with other schools. This option was made available for
any school (irrespective of Ofsted grade) if it joined an academy trust
with an outstanding school or an education partnerwith a strong record
of improvement. In April 2011, the criteria was further widened to in-
clude schools thatwere ‘performingwell’, which included consideration
of the last three years' exam results, the latest Ofsted inspections, and ﬁ-
nancial management.
As shown in Fig. 1, the initial take-up rate for primary academies in
the ﬁrst possible academic year (2010/11) was modest. This is unsur-
prising given the unexpected nature of the announcement, with legisla-
tion being rapidly passed by receiving royal assent in June 2010 and the
fact that schools are likely to take time before making the decision to
take on extra responsibilities (especially given the small size of primary
schools in England). However, after that, there was a huge rise in the
number of primary school academies in England between 2010/11
and 2016/17, with nearly a quarter of the sector being academy schools
by 2016/17.
Following the way in which numbers were constructed for Fig. 1,
schools are said to convert in a given academic school year (September
to August) if they are running as an academy by December of that aca-
demic year. Thus, for example, a school is classed as converting to acad-
emy status in 2014/15 if it converts at some point during the 2014
calendar year.
Table 1
Number of new primary converter academies in the study sample.
Academic year
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17
Pooled 12 174 252 234 243 210 309
Outstanding 10 74 51 40 35 30 35
Non-outstanding 2 100 201 194 208 180 274
Notes: In order to implement the research design, only schools in the sample that have students in grades 2 andgrades 6 in each academic year between 2006/07 and 2014/15 are included.
Themain discrepancy between the numbers in this Table and the total number of primary academies given in Fig. 1 arise because of: a) the removal of infant and junior schools (the latter
do not to enrol children in grade 2, while the former do not do so in grade 6) and b) because Fig. 1 also includes sponsored academies (comprising around 30% of primary academies) and a
small number of free schools (139 by 2016/17), which are not studied in this paper.
13 The point score can take on 7 values ranging from 3 to 27. The main results, given in
Table 8, are unchanged when KS1 is removed as a control.
14 These are identiﬁed by inclusion of grade 6 students who sit exams in treatment
schools prior to conversion.
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in this paper, by year of academy conversion, is given in Table 1. There
are a number of reasons for there being some discrepancy in numbers be-
tween Fig. 1 and Table 1. Firstly, because of the research design that is
adopted, schools are only included in the sample if they have students en-
rolled in grades 2 and 6 in each academic year between 2006/07 and
2014/15. Secondly, the analysis focusses only on academies that voluntar-
ily convert to academy status (around 30% of primary academies are
sponsored academies that typically convert as a result of government in-
tervention). Thirdly, schools that participated in theKS2 strike of 2009/10,
and who therefore have missing outcome data in that year, are excluded.
One further institutional detail of interest is that, in the post-May2010
phase of academisation, schools have also been encouraged to convert in
a chain or partnership. The Department for Education has stated ‘this can
enable schools to support one another once they are academies, share re-
sources, experience and ideas. Such an approach is particularly valuable
to small primary schools where working together allows economies of
scale to be achieved’ (Department for Education, 2013). The most preva-
lentmodel of collaboration is themulti-academy trust (MAT)wherein all
schools within theMAT are governed by one trust and board of directors.
MATs perform a role similar to that which would otherwise be played by
the LEA in that they hire/ﬁre teachers and are responsible for negotiating
every aspect of teacher contracts - the disciplinary process and redundan-
cy pay amongst other things - with the exception of pensions. MATs can
also substitute for local educational authorities (LEAs) in that they top-
slice funds allocated to schools under their trust and use this to supply
central services previously provided by the LEA. In 2016/17, about 80%
of primary academies were in amulti-academy trust. In the sample stud-
ied here, there are slightly fewer schools inMATS, with around 70% oper-
ating under this organisational structure.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
The National Pupil Database (NPD) is a census of all pupils in the
state system in England. NPD includes basic demographic details of pu-
pils – such as ethnicity, free school meal eligibility (FSM), gender, and
whether or not English is their ﬁrst language. The school attended by
pupils can be linked to other school-level information such as the date
of conversion to an academy school and the date and grade of Ofsted in-
spections (which are publicly available data). The data is longitudinal
and tracks students as they progress through the state school system.
As discussed in Section 2, the national curriculum in England is
organised aroundKey Stages, theﬁrst two undertaken in primary school
(in grades 1 to 6) and the second two in secondary school (in grades 7 to
11). Head teachers have a statutory duty to ensure that their teachers
comply with all aspects of the Key Stage assessment and reporting ar-
rangements. During primary school, this corresponds to Key Stage 1
and 2 which respectively cover grades 1–2 and 3–6. Local Authorities
(and other recognised bodies) are responsible for moderation of
schools. Thus, although teachers make their own assessments of stu-
dents (and therefore could be susceptible to potential bias), there is a
process in place to ensure that there is a meaningful assessment thatis standardised over all of England. At the end of grade 2 in Key Stage
1, students are given a ‘level’ (i.e. there is no test score as such). Howev-
er, following standard practice, National Curriculum levels achieved in
Key Stage 1 assessments are transformed into point scores using De-
partment for Education point scales and these scores are used in the em-
pirical work reported on below.13
At the end of primary school in grade 6 (or the end of the Key Stage 2
phase of education), pupils take national tests in reading and maths,
which are externally set and marked on a scale of 1–100. The ﬁnal
dataset used in this paper consists of multiple cross sections of grade 6
pupils linked to their school, demographic information, and test scores
for the academic year 2006/07 to 2014/15. Test scores – both baseline
KS1 and the outcome KS2 - are standardised, within the sample, at the
grade/year/subject level.
Other data sources are utilised in parts of the empirical analysis. The
School Workforce Census is school level data that is available from the
2010/11 school year and provides a snapshot of each maintained
school's workforce composition. Also studied is publicly available infor-
mation on the income and expenditure ofmaintained schools and acad-
emies that is available from the 2009/10 school year. Finally, some
results from a survey conducted by the Department for Education re-
garding the use of academy freedoms are presented (the source of
these survey data is Cirin, 2014). This survey, which covers 25% of the
2919 academies that had opened by 1st May 2013, pertains to the free-
doms exercised by schools once they gain academy status.
3.2. Methodology
Themain research question of interest is to identify the effect of acad-
emy conversion on pupil achievement in the grade 6 national Key Stage 2
tests taken by pupils at the end of primary school. Administrative data
that follows pupils through their school careers is used to estimate the
impact of academy enrolment on Key Stage 2 performance. In order to
study this, a research design where instrumental variables are combined
with difference-in-differences is implemented. In this design, outcomes
of individuals in academies are compared with those who attend schools
that later become academies, but do so after they sit their KS2 exams.
For a given cohort of year 6 pupils whowere legacy enrolled in acad-
emy conversions and control schools (future to be academies) a basic
estimating equation is the following
KS2ist ¼ αs þ αt þ θ1Academyist þ
XJ
j¼1
π1 jXjist þ φ1KS1ist þ v1ist ð1Þ
In (1) i denotes pupil, s denotes the legacy enrolment school and t
denotes school calendar year. Thus, αs is a legacy enrolment school
ﬁxed effect14 and αt is a time effect for the academic year in which the
pupil is in grade 6. The vector X is a set of control variables, and the bi-
nary Academy variable takes value 1 if pupil i who was legacy enrolled
18 In otherwords, the instrument is only assumed to satisfy the exclusion restriction con-
ditional on pupils being in a well-deﬁned sub-sample of the population.
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emy school. Finally, v1 is an error term.
Despite already restricting to the legacy enrolment sample so as to
avoid endogeneity concerns it may still be problematic to estimate Eq.
(1) by ordinary least squares because legacy enrolled pupils may leave
the school before the end of Key Stage 2. To allow for students to (poten-
tially) sort into schools non-randomly as a result of the school obtaining
academy status, an instrument for academy attendance is therefore
used. This is whether or not the pupil was already enrolled in the school
in the year prior to conversion in grades 2–5. Those for whom this vari-
able takes a value of one are referred to as being intention-to-treat (ITT).
Attention is focussed on those pre-enrolled in grades 2 to 5 as grade 5
is the penultimate year of primary education and grade 2 iswhen the KS1
assessment takes place, thus ensuring that KS1 assessment does not take
place in an academy for the ITT pupils.15 It is important to note that pupils
enrolling in the school after conversion are not included in the analysis.
To ensure that the control group and treatment group are selected in
the same way, a slightly different control group is used for each cohort
of academy converters. For those converting in 2010/11 for example,
the control group consists of pupils who are in grades 2–5 in 2009/10 at
schools that convert between 2011/12 and 2016/17, but are not expected
to sit their exams in an academy.16 Control groups are deﬁned similarly
for all schools converting up to and including 2014/15.17
Because of these restrictions, the event study on pupil performance
has to be limited to amaximumof four years post-conversion, including
the year of conversion itself. This is because there are 4 remaining years
of primary school after the Key Stage 1 assessment. Thus, pupils affected
by conversion in grade 2 of primary school (when KS1 assessments are
taken) could have up to four post-conversion years of education in the
academy. Similarly children affected by conversion when enrolled in
the predecessor school in grade 3 could have up to three conversion
years, and so on for children in grades 4 and 5 in the predecessor school.
This setup permits implementation of a research design which esti-
mates the causal impact of being in an academy. For a given cohort of
grade 6 treatment and control pupils this can be operationalised
through the following estimation equations:
Academyist ¼ αs þ αt þ θ2ITTi þ
XJ
j¼1
π2 jXjist þ φ2KS1ist þ v2ist ð2Þ
KS2ist ¼ αs þ αt þ θ3ITTi þ
XJ
j¼1
π3 jXjist þ φ3KS1ist þ v3ist ð3Þ
In theﬁrst stage, Eq. (2), estimates of θ2 show the proportion of the ITT
group that stay in the academyand take their KS2 tests there. Eq. (3) is the
reduced form regression of KS2 on the instrument. A two stage least
squares estimate (2SLS) estimate can then be obtained as the ratio of
the reduced form coefﬁcient to the ﬁrst stage coefﬁcient, θ3/θ2. The main
speciﬁcations that are estimated - Eqs. (2) and (3) - are based on pooled
data for the ﬁve cohorts of academy conversions already described.
Extending this to an event study framework enables separate esti-
mates for the number of years a pupil is exposed to being in an academy
post conversion (up to amaximumof four including conversion year) to
be obtained. In this case, there are four instruments for whether a pupil15 As schools typically enrol students 3 years prior to grade 2, we could estimate the ef-
fects for students pre-enrolled in academies in earlier grades. In our case,wewould be able
to estimate the effect of one extra year for those in grade 1 in the ﬁrst cohort of converters.
However, doing so would either entail dropping KS1 scores from our estimates or assum-
ing that KS1 performance is unaffected by academy attendance. Given that we do not gain
many observations by adding extra pre-enrolled pupils we focus on those pre-enrolled in
grade 2–5.
16 For example, in the case of the ﬁrst cohort this necessitates removing those who, in
2009/10, are grades 2–4 in 2011/12 converters, grades 2–3 in 2012/13 converters and
grade 2 in 2013/14 converters.
17 The exact control group/treatment group structure is given in the appendixis expected to sit their exams in the year of conversion (those in grade 5
in the year prior to conversion to instrument one year of exposure), the
next year (those in grade 4 in the year prior to conversion to instrument
two years of exposure) and so on up to the maximum of four years ex-
posure (for those legacy enrolled in grade 2). It should be noted that, be-
cause of the data that we have, not all cohorts of converters contribute
to the exposure estimates for later years. For instance, we can only iden-
tify the effect of four years exposure for those who are pre-enrolled in
grade 2 in the ﬁrst two cohorts of conversions.
3.3. Comparison schools
A naive comparison between primary academies and all other state-
maintained schools is likely to suffer from signiﬁcant selection bias,
since (as discussed above) conversion to an academywas done on a vol-
untary basis and better-performing schools were prioritised and active-
ly encouraged to convert.18 One might expect schools seeking to
become academies to have common unobservable characteristics such
as having a school ethos more in line with the academy model. To ac-
count for this, pupils attending future converters are used as a control
group in a difference-in-differences setting. Thus the data structure
that is utilised is a balanced panel of schools for the school years
2006/07 to 2014/15 with repeated cross-sections of grade 6 pupils.
3.4. Balancing tests
This approach can be legitimised ﬁrst through covariate balancing
tests between treatment and controls in the baseline academic year
(2006/07). Second, and probably more importantly, the empirical analy-
sis shows there to be no evidence of differential pre-conversion trends in
outcomes between pupils in treatment and control schools. On the for-
mer of these, Table 2 shows the extent to which treatment and control
groups are balanced at baseline (2006/07) for the full sample of treatment
and control schools, and separately for outstanding and non-outstanding
schools. In terms of the full sample of schools, there is a signiﬁcant differ-
encewith respect toKS2 scores prior to the policy,with treatment schools
being better performing in maths. The workforce in treatment schools
also appears to be both larger and, on average, younger and there are
more pupils enrolled in the treatment schools.
The above differences are not so surprisingwhen it is acknowledged
that the government prioritised better performing schools for conver-
sion to academy status. For instance, within the sample of schools stud-
ied here, over 80% of the ﬁrst cohort of conversions were deemed
outstanding by Ofsted. This proportion declines monotonically to 11%
for the 2016/17 cohort of conversions.19 For this reason it is necessary
to look within Ofsted grades (as deﬁned by the latest Ofsted grade
awarded prior to 2010/11) when comparing treatment and control
schools. When this is done, the schools look much more balanced on
observables.20 In fact, as Table 2 shows,within categories of outstanding
and non-outstanding schools, there are few statistically signiﬁcant dif-
ferences at baseline between treatment and control schools. In fact, for
outstanding schools there are no statistically signiﬁcant differences (at19 The exact proportions for the school years 2010/11 to 2016/17 are 83%, 43%, 20%, 17%,
14%, 14%,and 11%.
20 In addition to separately considering the relatively large number of pre-policy vari-
ables used here, we also adopted a different approach to create a single summary index
and perform balancing tests on this. On example comes from regressing the pre-policy
2006/07 KS2 scores on English is ﬁrst language, gender, ethnicity, free school meals status
and Key Stage 1. This new index was balanced across treatment and control schools. For
example in the case of the pooled sample, the treatment control difference (standard er-
ror) in the summary indexwas 0.025 (0.017), with a p-value of 0.14. The extent of balance
was seen to bemuch better in outstanding schoolswhere the treatment control difference
(standard error) in the summary index was−0.003 (0.033), with a p-value of 0.92. In
non-outstanding schools the difference was 0.034 (0.019) with a p-value of 0.078.
Table 3
Percentage using freedoms since becoming an academy: primary and secondary schools.
Secondary Primary
Table 2
Baseline characteristics: pooled sample and by Ofsted Grade.
All Schools Outstanding Schools Non-outstanding Schools
Treatment Control Treatment – Control
p-value
Treatment Control Treatment – Control
p-value
Treatment Control Treatment – Control
p-value
English is ﬁrst language 0.924 0.926 0.858 0.908 0.911 0.808 0.929 0.929 0.964
White British 0.877 0.881 0.609 0.855 0.854 0.989 0.883 0.886 0.543
Eligible to receive free school meals 0.126 0.133 0.336 0.108 0.109 0.889 0.131 0.138 0.309
Male 0.512 0.509 0.073 0.509 0.506 0.279 0.512 0.509 0.141
KS2 reading 0.049 0.003 0.418 0.298 0.280 0.647 −0.025 −0.048 0.496
KS2 maths 0.060 −0.010 0.032 0.334 0.296 0.300 −0.021 −0.066 0.060
KS1 reading 0.030 0.003 0.721 0.186 0.173 0.732 −0.016 −0.028 0.817
KS1 maths 0.024 −0.002 0.727 0.172 0.163 0.826 −0.02 −0.032 0.777
Number of teachers 14.958 14.294 0.020 16.443 15.419 0.087 14.516 14.09 0.093
Proportion unqualiﬁed teachers 0.033 0.030 0.484 0.039 0.036 0.587 0.031 0.029 0.624
Number of pupils 278.709 264.890 0.018 313.448 289.825 0.052 268.362 260.357 0.109
Pupil teacher ratio 18.555 18.322 0.231 19.179 18.843 0.402 18.369 18.228 0.372
Mean teacher age 41.077 41.483 0.034 40.276 40.413 0.630 41.322 41.683 0.032
Mean teacher salary 32,412 32,545 0.034 32,568 32,545 0.863 32,364 32,545 0.046
Number of schools 1434 275 1159
Notes: All variables aremeasured in the school year 2006/07. All KS1 and KS2 scores are standardised to havemean zero and standard deviation of 1 (within the year and overall sample).
Ofsted grades aremeasured prior to the policy. Since Ofsted inspect schools every 3–5 years (see Section 3), the grades here are themost recent grade between 2006/07 and 2009/10 (i.e.
prior to the policy change).
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scores.21 Thus, regressions are estimated for schools within each Ofsted
grade, as well as for the pooled sample.22
4. Did primary academies change their modes of operation?
Before looking at the effect of primary academies on pupil perfor-
mance, evidence is presented on whether changes in themode of oper-
ation occurred at primary schools that became academies prior to or
during the 2014/15 academic year. Four aspects of this are considered.
First, whether primary schools took up the option to exercise the
many academy freedoms that became available from increased autono-
my. Second, whether patterns of expenditure changed. Third, whether
there were changes in workforce composition. Fourth, whether acade-
mies altered their pupil intake.
4.1. Use of academy freedoms
There have been various investigations into whether schools actual-
ly use their academy freedoms upon conversion (e.g. Academies
Commission, 2013; Cirin, 2014). The existing descriptive evidence con-
ﬁrms that they mostly do, but with some degree of variation. The
Academies Commission (2013) conclude that take-up of freedoms had
been ‘piecemeal rather than comprehensive’, in part because changes
can take time to implement and sometimes require consultation. Sur-
veys of recent converters by Bassett et al. (2012) and Cirin (2014)
found ﬁnancial motives to be important in the decision to convert. In
the former study, over 75% of respondents cited it as one of their reasons
for converting and two-ﬁfths as their primary reason. Cirin (2014)
found that the desire ‘to gain greater freedom to use funding as you
see ﬁt’ was the most commonly cited reason for conversion (cited by21 The closest to signiﬁcance are school size (in terms of number of pupils) and number
of teachers. The next section reports results onwhether these changed signiﬁcantly on be-
coming an academy, revealing there to be no signiﬁcant changes.
22 While there are four possible grades awarded by Ofsted, two groups are considered,
outstanding and non-outstanding, the latter comprising good, satisfactory and unsatisfac-
tory. The direct focus on the outstanding group is because they were the ones that were
earmarked for the fast track to become an academy. The non-outstanding group are also
amalgamated on account of the relatively small number of satisfactory and unsatisfactory
schools in the sample. When estimating the pooled regressions over all schools, all vari-
ables are interacted with Ofsted grade.83% of respondents). The vast majority (almost 9 in 10) also moved to
procure services themselves.
Importantly, Cirin (2014) breaks down results by primary and
secondary status. This shows that the majority of academies do exer-
cise freedoms, but this is more common in secondary than in primary
schools. This is shown in Table 3, taken from his survey of 720 acad-
emies which were open on 1 May 2013. The numbers in the
Table show that most schools report a use of academy freedoms,
but that the percentage of primary schools making a particular
change is smaller than it is for secondary schools. Furthermore,
Cirin (2014) reports that almost all schools surveyed made at least
one change (702 out of 720), implying that at least 95% of primary
converters (262 primary converters were surveyed) exercised at
least one freedom, with two-thirds believing that the changes im-
proved attainment.4.2. Changes in expenditure patterns
Studies cited above on the use of academy freedoms suggest that the
ﬁnancial motive to convert was important. Table 4 shows numbers on
income and expenditure before and after conversion in treatment and
control schools using administrative data on school income and expen-
diture. Changes between the 2009/10 and the 2014/15 school years are
reported. There are somedata issues that need to be highlighted upfront
before discussing these numbers. First, the timing of reporting changed
after conversion, with academies reporting in the September–Augustschools schools
Changed your pattern of capital expenditure 63 54
Introduced savings in back-ofﬁce functions 62 54
Changed the performance management system for teachers 63 49
Changed the curriculum you offer 60 49
Changed school leadership 51 43
Introduced or increased revenue-generating activities 41 28
Hired teachers without qualiﬁed teacher status (ATS) 23 8
Sought to attach pupils from a different geographical area 14 5
Increased the length of the school day 10 5
Changed the length of school terms 6 2
Number of schools 360 334
Source: Cirin (2014). Online survey of 720 academies that were open on 1 May 2013.
Table 4
Changes in school income per pupil and expenditure per pupil before and after academy conversion.
Treatment schools Control schools Treatment – control
Before After Change Before After Change Difference-in-Difference
(1) (2) (3) = (2)–(1) (4) (5) (6) = (5)–(4) (7) = (3)–(6)
A. All Schools
(843 Treatment, 466 Control)
Total income 3974 4997 1023 (26) 4156 4883 727 (41) 296 (48)
Grant income 3810 4771 961 (24) 4019 4704 685 (40) 276 (47)
Other income 164 226 63 (10) 137 179 42 (7) 20 (12)
Total expenditure 3966 5121 1155 (33) 4154 4788 633 (43) 522 (54)
B. Outstanding (200 treatment, 59 co ntrol)
Total income 3755 4807 1052 (47) 3851 4819 967 (199) 85 (203)
Grant income 3580 4559 979 (43) 3706 4598 892 (199) 88 (202)
Other income 175 248 73 (23) 145 221 76 (27) −2 (35)
Total expenditure 3754 4890 1135 (59) 3834 4754 920 (201) 215 (208)
C. Non-outstanding
(643 Treatment, 407 Control)
Total income 4042 5056 1014 (30) 4200 4892 692 (37) 322 (48)
Grant income 3882 4837 955 (29) 4064 4719 655 (36) 300 (46)
Other income 160 220 59 (11) 136 173 37 (6) 22 (13)
Total expenditure 4032 5193 1161 (39) 4201 4792 592 (39) 569 (55)
Notes: The sources for expenditure data are publicly available consistent ﬁnancial reporting records for all state-maintained schools and academies ﬁnancial benchmarking data for acad-
emy schools. The former are available at https://www.compare-school-performance.service.gov.uk/ and the latter can be accessed at https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/statis-
tics-local-authority-school-ﬁnance-data. For academies opening in April to August of the school year, incomes and expenditures in the ﬁrst full year of conversion are appropriately scaled.
In columns (3), (6) and (7), long changes are considered between 2009/10 (Before) and 2014/15 (After). Standard errors in parentheses.
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in line with local authority ﬁnancial statements and was the practice in
schools before they converted to become an academy and in control
schools throughout the period of the analysis. Secondly, accounts for
schools that do not convert in the period (the control schools) do not in-
clude the value of LEA provided services; however, information is avail-
able on howmuch extra income is given to academies to cover the value
of these services (the Education Services Grant - ESG). To make the
numbers comparable this is removed from both the grant income and
expenditure for academies in column (2) of Table 4.
Columns (1) and (4) of Table 4 show that per pupil income and ex-
penditure was similar for the treatment and control schools before con-
version. For example, as shown in Panel A, total income in all treatment
and control schools was £3974 and £4156 per pupil respectively. Total
expenditure was £3966 and £4154 per pupil in treatment and control
schools respectively. As shown in Panels B to C of the Table, these pre-
conversion numbers are also closely aligned for the comparisons under-
taken within the outstanding and non-outstanding groups of schools.
It is evident, however, that converting primary schools both received
more money and spent more money post-conversion, even once the
extra money given for LEA provided services is accounted for. The
Table also shows the income and expenditure per pupil after conversion
and a difference-in-difference estimate in the ﬁnal column. This shows
signiﬁcant income and expenditure gaps arising after conversion rela-
tive towhat happened in the control schools. The differences in total in-
come and expenditure are estimated as £296 and £522 per pupil per
year. The increases are clearly driven by the relative increase in grant in-
come. A similar qualitative pattern is shown for schools classiﬁed as out-
standing and non-outstanding, butwith higher income and expenditure
shown for the latter schools, most likely reﬂecting a higher proportion
of disadvantaged students in this group.
Table 5 shows the change in categories of expenditure per pupil be-
fore and after conversion.24 There are three Panels, which differ23 For a small number of schools (35), the accounts cover a period exceeding 12months.
In these cases, it is known how long the accounts cover and numbers for them areweight-
ed accordingly (i.e. proportionately scaling down all items by the fraction 12/period
covered).
24 The detailed expenditure categories that have been aggregated to the four categories
in Table 5 are reported in Appendix Table A1.according to assumptions made about which services the academies
procure post-conversion given that they are no longer provided for
them by the local authority. The numbers in the upper Panel A are
changes inclusive of the extra money delegated to them. The numbers
in the middle Panel B subtract an equal share of the ESG money from
each category of expenditure. Finally, those in the lower Panel C remove
all of the extra ESG money from the expenditure on non-staff related
running costs.
In each case it is very clear that, even though primary academies
spent more on teaching staff, non-teaching staff, and other running
costs after conversion (relative to control schools), the increase was
greater for administrative costs (i.e. non-teaching staff and other run-
ning costs). This is true for schools in all Ofsted categories. Because the
amount of money earmarked for services previously provided by LEAs
from expenditure is removed, these shifts cannot be attributed solely
to themechanical shift caused by the school having to take onmore ad-
ministrative tasks post-conversion. It seems that the primary academies
studied in this paper did receivemore income, but that they spent it dis-
proportionately onday-to-day running operations rather than on ‘front-
line services’ such as teaching staff.
4.3. Changes in workforce
Table 6 reports evidence on changes in the composition of the school
workforce between 2010/11 and 2014/15 for schools that became acad-
emies in that period relative to schools that became academies in 2015/
16 and 2016/17. Changes are shown for all schools and stratiﬁed by
Ofsted rating. The Table reports difference-in-differences estimates for
the total number of teachers employed, the pupil/teacher ratio, the
mean teacher salary, the proportion of teachers who are in the leader-
ship group or whether the school changes its head teacher.
In general, the results reported in the Table show little evidence of
workforce changes resulting from academisation. The one exception is
head teacher turnover. For the full sample, there is a statistically signif-
icant 6.3 percentage point reduction in head teacher turnover in pri-
maries that became academies. When broken down by Ofsted
category, this occurs only in non-outstanding schools, which are 7.2
percentage points less likely to take on a new head teacher. This stands
in direct contrast to the ﬁnding of Eyles and Machin (2015) who found
that the vast majority of the ﬁrst phase of academy conversions in the
26 also looked at mobility between grades 2 and 6 and how it differs between treatment
and control schools. Using pupil mobility as an outcome variable revealed there to be no
differential transfer between the two sets of schools. Running this on all schools, andwith-
in the Ofsted groupings, detected no signiﬁcant differences.
27 Results for Tables 8 to 10 for maths and reading considered separately are available in
the appendix.
28 A second concern ﬂagged by referees was the potential for spillovers between treated
Table 5
Changes in expenditure category per pupil before and after academy conversion.
All Schools Outstanding Non-Outstanding
Pre-Change Mean Difference-in-Difference Pre-Change Mean Difference-in-Difference Pre-Change Mean Difference-in-Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Includes ESG
Total teaching staff 2063 58 (27) 1969 −43 (104) 2086 65 (27)
Total non-teaching staff 1236 168 (24) 1113 10 (66) 1266 197 (26)
Learning and ICT resources 212 −8 (8) 216 −3 (22) 211 −10 (9)
Other running costs 523 305 (22) 475 251 (47) 535 318 (25)
B. ESG Equally Deducted
Total teaching staff 2063 32 (27) 1969 −75 (104) 2086 40 (27)
Total non-teaching staff 1236 148 (24) 1113 −12 (66) 1266 178 (26)
Learning and ICT resources 212 −12 (8) 216 −8 (22) 211 −13 (9)
Other running costs 523 294 (22) 475 239 (47) 535 308 (25)
C. ESG deducted from other running costs
Total teaching staff 2063 58 (27) 1969 −43 (104) 2086 65 (27)
Total non-teaching staff 1236 168 (24) 1113 10 (66) 1266 197 (26)
Learning and ICT resources 212 −8 (8) 216 −3 (22) 211 −10 (9)
Other running costs 523 245 (22) 475 181 (49) 535 262 (26)
Number of treatment schools
Number of control schools
843
466
200
59
643
407
Notes: As for Table 4. The top panel includes extra money given to academies to cover services previously provided by the LEA. The middle panel removes this expenditure equally from
each expenditure category. The bottom panel removes all the extra money from the other running costs category.
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and therefore that changes inmanagerial structurewere a key feature of
academy conversion that facilitated increased autonomy. This mecha-
nism appears to be completely absent in the case of primary schools.
4.4. Changes in intake
Alongside performance effects we look at whether pupil composi-
tion changed once a school gained academy status. As data is available
prior to 2010/11, the analysis considers year-on-year changes between
2006/07 and 2014/15 in the characteristics of those entering the earliest
grade inwhich the schools enrol pupils. We also include observations of
pupils over this period that enter schoolswhich becomeacademies after
the sample ends (in 2015/16 and 2016/17). The three outcomes consid-
ered are the fraction of the pupil intake who are eligible for free school
meals, the fraction with English as a native language, and the total size
of the entry year intake (in logs). In each case, school and year effects
are included. The results, presented in Table 7, show no evidence that
schools alter their intake along these dimensions.25
5. Summary
Taken together, the ﬁndings show that primary schools changed
some aspects of their operations after becoming academies. In particu-
lar, most primary academies began to use freedoms made available to
them as a consequence of conversion. They also received more income
and altered how their expenditure was allocated across functions.
With regard to the latter, the observed spending changes mainly affect-
ed administrative functioning andday-to-day operations, because of the
removal of such provision from the local authority. At the same time,
there was not much change in the school personnel or in composition
of the pupil intake.
6. 5. Pupil performance results
This section reports the results on pupil performance, starting with
the main baseline set of results showing the causal impact of academy
conversion on pupil performance. Then, in the light of the previous25 This contrasts with the ﬁndings on the ﬁrst batch of secondary school academies re-
ported in Eyles and Machin (2015), where intake changed signiﬁcantly.section's results showing that most, but not all, primary schools altered
their modes of operation post-conversion, heterogeneous estimates
along a number of dimensions are reported.6.1. Main results
Table 8 shows estimates of the 2SLS speciﬁcations studying the im-
pact of academisation on pupil performance in reading and maths
tests at the end of primary school. Separate coefﬁcients are shown for
each subject, both for the pooled sample and by whether the predeces-
sor school's Ofsted grade was outstanding or not. Columns (1) to
(3) show estimates when the treatment is whether the school converts
to academy status. Columns (4) to (6) show estimates for years of
exposure.
As the vast majority of legacy enrolled pupils stay in the school to
take their KS2 exams - ﬁrst stage estimates range from 0.92 to 0.95 -
only 2SLS estimates are presented. In all cases, there is no evidence of
any performance boost from academisation. The estimates are small in
magnitude, sometimes negative, and almost all statistically insigniﬁ-
cant. In terms of magnitude, the largest positive estimate is 0.02σ
(with standard error 0.03) for reading in outstanding schools as report-
ed in speciﬁcation (2) of the Table. All of the other 2SLS estimates are
lower than this, andnine of the twelvemaths and reading estimates (in-
cluding all six for maths) have negative signs.When considering the av-
erage of reading and maths scores it seems that primary age pupils did
not beneﬁt from attending an academy school in terms of their perfor-
mance at the end of primary school.26 As results prove similar whether
reading or math marks are used as the outcome of interest, only results
based on average points are shown for the rest of the paper.27
Onemight be concerned about the research design being potentially
contaminated by differential pre-policy trends.28 Fig. 2 therefore showsand control schools. To deal with this we re-estimated ourmain regressions, but removed
control schools that were within 3 km of any treated school. Our results were unaffected
by this change.
Table 6
Changes in Workforce, School-Level Difference-in-Differences Estimates.
All Schools Outstanding Non-Outstanding
(1) (2) (3)
Log(Number of teachers) 0.007 (0.012) 0.015 (0.025) 0.007 (0.014)
Log(Pupil teacher ratio) −0.018 (0.011) −0.007 (0.023) −0.016 (0.012)
Log(Mean teacher salary) −0.003 (0.007) 0.001 (0.013) −0.006 (0.008)
Proportion of teachers in leadership group 0.003 (0.005) 0.005 (0.010) 0.003 (0.005)
Change in head teacher −0.063 (0.028) −0.002 (0.070) −0.072 (0.031)
Notes: Based on data from the schools' workforce census for the academic years 2010/11 and 2014/15. All variables are long changes between these two academic years. The subsample is
the sample of schools who are observed in each of the two years. We exclude schools converting in 2010/11 as we do not observe a pre-treatment observation. Robust standard errors in
parentheses are reported in each case. The sample sizes for theﬁrst three rows (Number of teachers; Pupil teacher ratio; proportion of teachers in leadership group) are 1326, 254, 1072 for
all schools, outstanding schools, and non-outstanding schools respectively. For thehead teacher regression the sample sizes are 1327, 257 and 1070 for all schools, outstanding schools, and
non-outstanding schools respectively. Baseline means are: 15.321 teachers; 21.565 pupils per teacher; £36,446 average salary; 0.173 of teachers are in the leadership group 0.445 of
schools change head teacher over the course of the ﬁve years.
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tending academies four years prior to academy conversion to three
years after. The effects of being in an academy remain numerically
small and insigniﬁcant (as the c to c + 3 coefﬁcients all overlap
with the zero line on the Figure). Moreover, there is no sign of pre-
policy trends, nor any gradual improvement in results post-
conversion.
Table 9 also further generalises the Table 8 baseline results by
reporting estimates for legacy enrolled pupils by discrete years of expo-
sure, ranging fromone to amaximumof four. Again, there is neither any
sign of a positive effect nor any suggestion that beneﬁts might be in-
creasing with years of exposure. If anything, the opposite is the case,
as the absolute values of the negative coefﬁcients mostly get larger
with more years of exposure.Table 7
Changes in pupil intake.
All Schools Outstanding
FSM English language Log (no of pupils) FSM Engl
Academy 0.000 −0.007 0.007 0.002 0.00
(0.003) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.01
School ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 467,386 466,635 12,906 102,565 102,
Number of schools 1434 1434 1434 275 275
Notes: Variables refer to the pupils entering the lowest grade in the school in each year. Each cel
clustered at school level.
Table 8
The Effect of Treatment on KS2 Test Scores (measured at age 11).
2SLS (Incidence)
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled Outstanding Non-Outs
Maths −0.021 −0.002 −0.027
(0.014) (0.030) (0.016)
Reading 0.001 0.020 −0.005
(0.013) (0.026) (0.014)
Average point score −0.013 0.008 −0.021
(0.014) (0.029) (0.016)
School ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 1,636,948 296,675 1,340,273
Number of schools 1434 275 1159
First stage 0.937
(0.002)
0.950
(0.002)
0.932
(0.002)
Notes: Each cell is a coefﬁcient estimated from a separate regression. Full controls are included
attainment (Key Stage 1). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at school level.6.2. Heterogeneity
While there is no evidence of performance effects on average, both
in the event study and years of exposure analysis, it may still be the
case that academisation has scope to beneﬁt some subsets of students
and not others. It is also possible that certain school characteristics
may be associated with differential academy effects on pupil
performance.
Table 10 therefore shows results from an investigation of whether
the estimated 2SLS effect size differs in several ways: i) with whether
the pupil is eligible for free school meals or not; ii) with an indicator
for whether the school is in an urban area or not (given that the charter
school literatureﬁnds positive effects to be concentrated amongst urban
schools); iii) whether it differs with pre-conversion school size (asNot-outstanding
ish language Log (no of pupils) FSM English language Log (no of pupils)
4 0.009 −0.001 −0.011 0.006
9) (0.012) (0.003) (0.011) (0.007)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
459 2475 364,821 364,176 10,431
275 1159 1159 1159
l is a coefﬁcient estimated from a separate regression. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
2SLS (Years of Exposure)
(4) (5) (6)
tanding Pooled Outstanding Non-outstanding
−0.012 −0.004 −0.016
(0.007) (0.014) (0.008)
−0.004 0.005 −0.007
(0.006) (0.012) (0.007)
−0.010 −0.001 −0.014
(0.007) (0.014) (0.008)
Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
1,636,948 296,675 1,340,273
1434 275 1159
0.928
(0.002)
0.942
(0.003)
0.922
(0.003)
(for gender, ethnicity, speaks English as ﬁrst language, eligible for free schools meals, prior
Fig. 2. Event study estimates, pre- and post-academy conversion Notes: c refers to
academy conversion year. KS2 performance is measured by standardised average point
score. The coefﬁcients come from the same 2SLS estimates as reported in column (1) of
Table 8, but with dummies for the number of years before or after conversion the exam
is sat in an academy. The four post conversion dummies (c to c + 3) are instrumented
for with four ITT/ITT grade interactions. A joint test for the signiﬁcant of the pre-
conversion dummies gives a chi square statistic of 0.71 (p-value = 0.59).
Table 9
Effects by year of exposure.
All schools Outstanding Non-outstanding
Average
point
score
Average
point score
Average point
score
One year of exposure 0.001
(0.012)
0.011
(0.024)
−0.001 (0.014)
Two years of exposure −0.015
(0.016)
0.030
(0.030)
−0.030 (0.019)
Three years of exposure −0.042
(0.022)
−0.024
(0.045)
−0.049 (0.025)
Four years of exposure −0.042
(0.033)
−0.020
(0.060)
−0.053 (0.039)
School ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 1,636,948 296,675 1,340,273
Number of schools 1434 275 1159
First stage coefﬁcient on IIT x one
year of exposure
0.963
(0.001)
0.974
(0.002)
0.960 (0.002)
First stage coefﬁcient on IIT x two
years of exposure
0.931
(0.002)
0.946
(0.003)
0.926 (0.003)
First stage coefﬁcient on IIT x three
years of exposure
0.902
(0.004)
0.927
(0.005)
0.891 (0.005)
First stage coefﬁcient on IIT x four
years of exposure
0.869
(0.007)
0.889
(0.008)
0.857 (0.011)
Notes: 2SLS estimates reported. Full controls are included (for gender, ethnicity, speaks
English as ﬁrst language, eligible for free schools meals, prior attainment, primary school).
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at school level.
Table 10
Heterogeneity.
All Schools Outstanding Non-Outstanding
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and iv) whether the school joins a multi-academy trust (MAT).
The results reported in the Table do little to alter the prior analysis.
First, there is little evidence that the effect of academy attendance dif-
fers depending on whether one is eligible for free school meals or at-
tends an urban academy. Panel C of Table 10, shows that the same can
be said for pupils attending schools of differing sizes. Although perfor-
mance effects appear to decline with school size, none of these interac-
tions reach statistical signiﬁcance.
The ﬁnal aspect of heterogeneity considered –whether or not pupils
attend an academy that becomes part of a (MAT) or not – does uncover
some differences. Themost noteworthy is that some of the estimates for
not being in a MAT are signiﬁcantly negative. This is the case for all
schools where there is a 0.06σ (0.02) fall – closer investigation shows
that this is conﬁned to the non-outstanding schools. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that conversion in stand-alone (non-MAT) schools,
which are not able to beneﬁt from the economies of scale that aMAT canFig. 3. Event study estimates by (pre-intervention) Ofsted Grade Notes: c refers to
academy conversion year. KS2 performance is measured by the standardised average
point score. The coefﬁcients come from the same 2SLS estimates as reported in columns
(2) and (3) of Table 8, but with dummies for the number of years before or after
conversion the exam is sat in an academy. The four post conversion dummies (c to c
+ 3) are instrumented for with four ITT/ITT grade interactions. A joint test for the
signiﬁcant of the pre-conversion dummies gives a chi square statistic of 1.26 (p-value =
0.28) in the case of outstanding schools and 0.79 (p-value = 0.60) in the case of non-
outstanding.bring, may have actually proven detrimental to pupils enrolled in previ-
ously non-outstanding academies. However, this result should be taken
with caution. About 60% of the primary academies considered here are
part of a MAT, but it should be acknowledged that whether or not a
school is able to join a trust is endogenous to KS2 performance; results
showing performance drops could be due to negative selection to theAverage Point
Score
Average Point
Score
Average Point
Score
A. Free school meal eligibility
Yes 0.008 (0.021) 0.025 (0.045) 0.004 (0.024)
No −0.017
(0.014)
0.006 (0.029) −0.025 (0.015)
B. Urban
Yes −0.012
(0.015)
0.019 (0.031) −0.023 (0.018)
No −0.021
(0.019)
−0.037
(0.038)
−0.013 (0.021)
C. Baseline school size
Treatment 0.108 (0.103) 0.278 (0.166) 0.065 (0.128)
Treatment ∗ baseline school
size
−0.021
(0.018)
−0.046
(0.029)
−0.015 (0.023)
D. Multi academy trust
Yes 0.030 (0.016) 0.032 (0.033) 0.031 (0.019)
No −0.057
(0.017)
−0.013
(0.034)
−0.075 (0.020)
Notes: 2SLS estimates comparable to columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 8, but with mutu-
ally exclusive interactions included for panels A, B, and to D. Panel C reports estimates that
interact treatment status with baseline (2006/07) school size in logs. In terms of free
school meal status, 14% of pupils in the treated schools are eligible, 12% of pupils in out-
standing treated schools are eligible, and 15% of pupils in non-outstanding treated. For
all treated schools in the sample 71% are in urban areas and 57% are in multi-academy
trusts. The same numbers for outstanding and non-outstanding schools are: urban 72%/
71%; multi-academy trusts 50%/59% respectively.
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outstanding schools).
7. Conclusion
The English government has radically restructured its school system
under the assumption that academisation delivers beneﬁts to schools
and students. This paper studies the unexpected policy change that oc-
curred in 2010 that enabled (and encouraged) primary schools to be-
come academies. It looks at the ﬁrst primary schools that have
become academies in England (between 2010/11 and 2014/15) and
ﬁnds no evidence of pupil performance improvement resulting from
conversion.
How should an overall zero effect be interpreted in the light of
evidence showing positive effects of autonomy in other contexts? One
reason is that schools that converted were already doing well within
the system and simply did not require additional autonomy in order
to thrive and therefore did not make substantive changes. Indeed the
limited changes that are seen – increasing expenditure on non-
instructional tasks – do not correspond to the kinds of changes, such
as effective discipline and higher quality teaching that have been
found to increase test scores in other contexts such as charter schools
(Fryer, 2014).
In existing research, much of the positive effects of autonomous
schools have been shown for disadvantaged students and not so much
for advantaged students. While there was scope to improve achieve-
mentwithin these schools, it may be that changes introduced as a result
of school autonomy simply do not beneﬁt such students at the margin.
However, given the survey evidence reported above and the research
into how additional income was used by schools, it would appear that
many of these schools did not make changes that affect ‘frontline ser-
vices’ (as opposed to administrative roles).
Another possible reason is that effects are estimated in the short run.
It may be that the programmewill bear fruit once more schools convert
and facilitate greater economies of scale by entering into or deepening
collaborative arrangements with each other. In the heterogeneity anal-
ysis, we found some evidence of variation bywhether or not schools are
in amulti-academy trust. Althoughwedonot take the effect to be causal
due to the endogenous decision to join a MAT, it is still a worrying ﬁnd-
ing that performance dips for the non-outstanding primary schools
(around 40% of converters) that do not join a multi-academy trust.
Finally, one of the key models for some successful urban charters in
the US and some secondary schools in England29 – an effective disci-
pline approach for academies and the No Excuses model of charters –
is of less relevance to the age range of children enrolled in English pri-
mary schools than for secondary age children (since behavioural prob-
lems that may lead pupils to be suspended or excluded from school
are muchmore prevalent in the latter).30 In the light of all these factors,
it is not surprising that there has been no overall effect on pupil
performance.
Onemight argue that if academisation has no average effect on pupil
performance, this could still be a reasonable public policy if there are
other reasons for why this might be beneﬁcial – for example, if school
leaders can more easily make changes that might beneﬁt students (or
their parents) and staff. However, the process of restructuring individu-
al schools has been shown to be ﬁnancially costly and restructuring on a29 A well-known, and highly publicised, example of the latter is Hackney's Haggerston
School in London which is a secondary school has fully utilised an effective discipline
and good behaviour approach in its successful rise up the KS4 achievement distribution,
despite having a relatively disadvantaged pupil intake.
30 For instance, exclusions and ﬁxed term suspensions are extremely rare in the age
range that we study. In English schools, 3.88% of pupils received a ﬁxed period exclusion
in 2014/15, and 0.07%were permanently excluded. For primary schools the numberswere
much lower - 1.1% of pupils received a ﬁxed term exclusion and 0.02% were permanently
excluded in the school year 2014/15 (Department for Education, 2016).systemwide basis would likely prove to be too costly in the long run if it
fails to generate gains for students in terms of test scores. Furthermore,
risks are also posed by an increasing number of schools becoming
academies.31 For example, they are no longer regularly monitored at
the local level. Problems might not therefore come to light unless they
are ﬂagged up by an Ofsted inspection, which are not regular events.
There are potential negative spill-overs on other schools if opting out of
Local Authority control undermines services that the Local Authority is
able to provide to other schools in the same geographic area (e.g. child
psychologists to support children with special needs in many schools).
Studying theoperational aspects of academies, and the institutional struc-
tures in which they function, is an important subject for future research.
Appendix A. Appendix
This Appendix contains information on theway inwhich the sample
of pupils and schools were selected for the analysis of primary acade-
mies, issues related to the school income and expenditure data analysed
in the paper, and provides the main estimates in Tables 9-10 of the
paper by subject.
1. Sample accounting structure
Here we describe the structure of the Intention to Treat (ITT) groups
in eachwave of academy conversions that are studied. Becausewe com-
bine difference in differences with instrumental variables, we use a dif-
ferent group of control schools for each cohort of academy conversion.
Below we detail the treatment and control samples for each of the ﬁve
treated cohorts of academy conversions.
For the ﬁrst cohort of conversions, the ITT sample consists of those in
grades 2–5 in 2009/10 in 2010/11 converters. Alongside this we have
pupils in grade 6 in 2010/11 converters in the years 2006/07 to 2009/
10. As controls we include the following: those in grade 6 in the years
2006/07 to 2009/10who sit their exams in schools that go on to convert
to academies between 2011/12 and 2016/17; those in grades 2–5 in
2009/10 in 2016/17 converters; those in grades 2–5 in 2009/10 in
2015/16 converters; those in grades 2–5 in 2009/10 in 2014/15 con-
verters; those in grades 3–5 in 2009/10 in 2013/14 converters; those
in grades 4–5 in 2009/10 in 2012/13 converters; those in grade 5 in
2009/10 in 2011/12 converters.
For the second cohort of conversions, the ITT sample consists of
those in grades 2–5 in 2010/11 in 2011/12 converters. Alongside this
we have pupils in grade 6 in 2011/12 converters in the years 2006/07
to 2010/11. As controls we include the following: those in grade 6 in
the years 2006/07 to 2010/11 who sit their exams in schools that go
on to convert to academies between 2012/13 and 2016/17; those in
grades 2–5 in 2010/11 in 2016/17 converters; those in grades 2–5 in
2010/11 in 2015/16 converters; those in grades 3–5 in 2010/11 in
2014/15 converters; those in grades 4–5 in 2010/11 in 2013/14 con-
verters; those in grade 5 in 2010/11 in 2012/13.
For the third cohort of conversions, the ITT sample consists of those
in grades 3–5 in 2011/12 in 2012/13 converters. Alongside this we have
pupils in grade 6 in 2012/13 converters in the years 2006/07 to 2011/12.
As controlswe include the following: those in grade 6 in the years 2006/
07 to 2011/12 who sit their exams in schools that go on to convert to
academies between 2013/14 and 2016/17; those in grades 3–5 in
2011/12 in 2016/17 converters; those in grades 3–5 in 2011/12 in
2015/16 converters; those in grades 4–5 in 2011/12 in 2014/15 con-
verters; those in grade 5 in 2011/12 in 2013/14.
For the fourth cohort of conversions, the ITT sample consists of those
in grades 4–5 in 2012/13 in 2013/14 converters. Alongside this we have
pupils in grade 6 in 2013/14 converters in the years 2006/07 to 2012/13.
As controlswe include the following: those in grade 6 in the years 2006/31 See Ladd and Fiske (2016).
Table A1
Expenditure categories.
Total teaching staff Total non-teaching staff Learning and ICT resources Other running costs
Teaching Staff
Supply teaching staff
Supply teacher insurance
Agency supply teaching staff
(minus) Receipts from supply teacher
insurance claims
Education support staff
Cost of other staff
Indirect employee expenses
Development and training
Staff related insurance
Administrative and clerical staff
Administrative supply
Bought in professional services such as
auditor costs
Learning resources (not ICT
equipment)
ICT learning resources
Premises staff
Building maintenance and improvement
Grounds maintenance and improvement
Cleaning and caretaking
Water and sewerage
Other occupation costs
Catering staff
Catering supplies
(minus) Income from catering
Energy
Bought in professional services – curriculum
Rates
Exam fees
Other insurance premiums
Special facilities
Table A2
Effects by year of exposure, by subject.
All Schools Outstanding Non-outstanding
Maths Reading Maths Reading Maths Reading
One year of exposure −0.005 0.012 0.001 0.021 −0.007 0.009
(0.012) (0.011) (0.022) (0.022) (0.014) (0.012)
Two years of exposure −0.027 0.006 0.018 0.041 −0.043 −0.006
(0.017) (0.014) (0.032) (0.026) (0.019) (0.017)
Three years of exposure −0.045 −0.029 −0.026 −0.013 −0.052 −0.034
(0.023) (0.019) (0.045) (0.039) (0.026) (0.022)
Four years of exposure −0.037 −0.026 −0.034 0.005 −0.036 −0.044
(0.033) (0.030) (0.058) (0.056) (0.04) (0.034)
School ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 1,636,948 296,675 1,340,273
Number of schools 1434 275 1159
First stage coefﬁcient on IIT × one year of exposure 0.963
(0.001)
0.974
(0.002)
0.960
(0.002)
First stage coefﬁcient on IIT × two years of exposure 0.931
(0.002)
0.946
(0.003)
0.926
(0.003)
First stage coefﬁcient on IIT × three years of exposure 0.902
(0.004)
0.927
(0.005)
0.891
(0.005)
First stage coefﬁcient on IIT × four years of exposure 0.869
(0.007)
0.889
(0.008)
0.857
(0.011)
Notes: 2SLS estimates reported. Full controls are included (for gender, ethnicity, speaks English asﬁrst language, eligible for free schoolsmeals, prior attainment, primary school). Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at school level.
32 See bhttps://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/income-and-expenditure-in-
academies-in-england-2014-to-2015N for 2014/15 data.
33 bhttps://www.compare-school-performance.service.gov.uk/N
34 While the data are publicly available some variables are suppressed; for instance,
teaching staff costs are suppressed for small schools for conﬁdentiality reasons (it is also
necessary to suppress other costs at random so as tomake it impossible to impute teaching
costs from total expenditure). The data that we use in our estimates is not subject to this
suppression.
119A. Eyles et al. / Journal of Public Economics 155 (2017) 108–12107 to 2012/13 who sit their exams in schools that go on to convert to
academies between 2014/15 and 2016/17; those in grades 4–5 in
2012/13 in 2016/17 converters; those in grades 4–5 in 2012/13 in
2015/16 converters; those in grade 5 in 2012/13 in 2014/15 converters.
For the ﬁfth and ﬁnal cohort of conversions, the ITT sample consists
of those in grades 5 in 2013/14 in 2014/15 converters. Alongside thiswe
have pupils in grade 6 in 2014/15 converters in the years 2006/07 to
2013/14. As controls we include the following: those in grade 6 in the
years 2006/07 to 2013/14 who sit their exams in schools that go on to
convert to academies between 2015/16 and 2016/17; those in grades
5 in 2013/14 in 2016/17 converters; those in grades 5 in 2013/14 in
2015/16 converters.
2. Income and expenditure data sources
The income and expenditure data come from two sources; ﬁrst, data
on income and expenditure for academy schools is from the publiclyavailable (at the Department for Education website32) benchmark ac-
counts returns, required by the Department for Education, for all acade-
my schools; second, data for maintained schools comes from consistent
ﬁnancial reports, which are also made publicly available, as part of the
school performance tables.33,34
While maintained schools and academies are both required to sub-
mit ﬁnancial returns, so as to allow the public to benchmark schools
spending against each other, the data collected is slightly different for
academies and state schools. In particular, state schools ﬁle a return
Table A3
Heterogeneous effects, by subject.
All Schools Outstanding Non-Outstanding
Maths Reading Maths Reading Maths Reading
A. Free school meal eligibility
Yes −0.012 0.024 0.008 0.031 −0.018 0.022
(0.021) (0.019) (0.047) (0.040) (0.024) (0.022)
No −0.022 −0.003 −0.003 0.018 −0.029 −0.010
(0.014) (0.012) (0.029) (0.025) (0.016) (0.014)
B. Urban
Yes −0.021 0.003 0.005 0.031 −0.030 −0.007
(0.016) (0.013) (0.032) (0.027) (0.018) (0.015)
No −0.012 −0.006 −0.031 −0.029 −0.015 0.004
(0.019) (0.017) (0.039) (0.035) (0.022) (0.020)
C. Baseline school size
Treatment 0.166 0.060 0.382 0.159 0.103 0.041
(0.104) (0.093) (0.165) (0.17) (0.129) (0.111)
Treatment ∗ baseline school size −0.032 −0.01 −0.065 −0.024 −0.023 −0.008
(0.018) (0.016) (0.029) (0.03) (0.023) (0.020)
D. Multi academy trust
Yes 0.023 0.035 0.018 0.046 0.026 0.032
(0.017) (0.014) (0.034) (0.030) (0.019) (0.016)
No −0.064 −0.033 −0.020 −0.004 −0.082 −0.044
(0.017) (0.016) (0.034) (0.031) (0.020) (0.018)
Notes: 2SLS estimates comparable to columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 9, but with mutually exclusive interactions included for panels A, B and D. Panel C reports estimates that interact
treatment status with baseline (2006/07) school size (in logs). In terms of free school meal status, 14% of pupils in the treated schools are eligible, 12% of pupils in outstanding treated
schools are eligible, and 15% of pupils in non-outstanding treated. For all treated schools in the sample 71% are in urban areas and 57% are in multi-academy trusts. The same numbers
for outstanding and non-outstanding schools are: urban 72%/71%; multi-academy trusts 50%/59% respectively.
Fig. A1. Notes: as for Fig. 2.
Fig. A2. Notes: as for Fig. 3.
Fig. A3. Notes: as for Fig. 3.
120 A. Eyles et al. / Journal of Public Economics 155 (2017) 108–121for the standard ﬁnancial year (April to March) while academies ﬁle a
return covering the academic year (September to August). Exemptions
are also available for academies in terms of both the length of the return
and whether or not a return must be ﬁled. When schools convert be-
tween March and August of a given year they have the option to ﬁle a
return that exceeds 12 months (but is less than 18 months). In the
very small number of cases where this is done the data are weighted
to be made comparable with a 12 month return (i.e. proportionally
weighting by 12 divided by the number of months for which the return
is ﬁled).
Table A1 shows a breakdown of the expenditures that are in each
category.3535 A detailed discussion of these categories is available at: https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/423098/CFR_guidance_
FINAL_150415.pdf
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